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Using Dagher to Refine the Analysis of
Mergers and Joint Ventures in Petroleum
Industries and Beyond
By Peter C. Carstensen*

I. Introduction
The recent decision in Texaco v. Dagher' illustrates problems
with the contemporary strategy employed by plaintiffs' attorneys of
narrowly framing antitrust claims to assert "per se" illegality without
any explanation of what makes the specific conduct anticompetitive.
Although this strategy is understandable given the Supreme Court's
hostility towards competition as a public policy goal, the result of this
process is harm to the fundamental public interest in having workably
competitive markets. This is particularly true in the case of petroleum where there have been a number of consolidations. In addition,
the major firms in the industry have a tradition of entering into joint
ventures and other cooperative agreements. Others have told and retold the history of anticompetitive activities by the major oil and gas
companies starting
with the infamous Standard Oil of New Jersey v.
2
United States.
*Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School. I am very much indebted to Eric Johnson for diligent research and editorial assistance.
1Texaco v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006).
2

See Peter Carstensen, How to Assess the Impact of Antitrust on the American

Economy: Examining History or Theorizing, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1175, 1210-1212
(1989) (brief summary of the history of antitrust cases in the oil and gas industry);
James Brock, Antitrust Policy and the Oligopoly Problem, 51 ANTITRUST
BULL.227, 232-246 (2006) (summarizing contemporary data on concentration and
conduct in the oil and gas industry); Diana Moss, Competition in U.S. Petroleum
Refining and Marketing, Pts. I & II (Am. Antitrust Inst. Working Papers Nos. 0702, 07-03, 2007), available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/archives/files/
Competition%20in%20US%20Refining%20and%2OMarketing%20-%20part%201_
013020071106.pdf (last visited May 21, 2007) and http://www.antitrustinstitute.
org/archives/files/Competition%20in%20US%2ORefining%20and%20Marketing%
20-%20part%2011013020071138.pdf (last visited May 21, 2007); U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-96 ,ENERGY MARKETS: EFFECTS OF MERGERS AND
MARKET CONCENTRATION IN THE U.S. PETROLEUM INDUSTRY (2004), available at
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The goal of this brief comment is to highlight how the plaintiffs' narrow conception of the case concerning market exploitation
collided with the Dagher Court's refusal to recognize the implications of the evidence. As an appeal to law reviews, the goal is to explain why the plaintiffs had a plausible case, and how it might have
been framed to increase their chances of prevailing. Such after the
fact case specific analysis has utility only insofar as it suggests how
future cases might avoid the fate of Dagher.
The Dagher case focused on a decision by oil companies,
Texaco and Shell, to restrain the pricing discretion of the managers
participating in their joint venture to refine and market gasoline in the
Western United States, where the joint venture's market share of
gasoline exceeded 25 percent. 3 As the owners of this venture, Texaco and Shell commanded the managers to maintain uniform prices
between the two brands in every specific market area.4 Prior to this
action, Texaco gas had sold below the prices of other major brands,
and so the immediate implication of this restraint was to raise the
price of Texaco branded gas by roughly two cents per gallon. 5 In this
context, such a restraint would seem to be contrary to the best interests of the joint venture as a profit-maximizing enterprise. If price
uniformity was a rational strategy for the firm, presumably the managers would have adopted this pricing strategy independently.
After adopting this price coordination requirement, both
brands apparently experienced a substantial price increase despite
lower costs of production and declining prices of petroleum.6 Thus,
the elimination of price differences in some way resulted in a general
increase in the price of both gasoline brands in circumstances where
the price increasingly diverged from the cost of production. While a
profit-maximizing firm necessarily seeks to increase the margin between cost and price, in a workably competitive market a firm ought

http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d0496high.pdf [hereinafter The GAO Report] (finding increased concentration resulting from mergers has resulted, inter alia, in higher
consumer prices).
3 Dagher v. Saudi Refining, Inc, 369 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2004).
4

Id. at

1112.

5 See Brief of Amicus Curiae American Antitrust Institute in Support of Respondents at 3, Texaco v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2005) (Nos. 04-805, 04-814), available at http://antitrustinstitute.org/archives/files/465.pdf (citing Respondents' Brief

at 6).
6 Dagher, 369

F.3d. at 1113 (showing in the record a $.40 per gallon increase
in Los Angeles, and a $30 increase in both Seattle and Portland despite declining
crude oil prices).
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not to be able to increase prices as its costs decline. 7 At best, a firm
experiencing uniquely lower costs might hold prices constant in an
effort to increase its margins. Thus, the observed events are anomalous in terms of the standard predictions of economics. They suggest
that the price coordination between the two brands in some way
caused or contributed to the increased ability of the joint venture to
exploit buyers by increasing prices without any cost justification.
The plaintiffs focused on the agreement to set a uniform price
as the central issue in their case. 8 They developed a strong record
that there was no business explanation for the adoption of this price
policy relating to the refining and distribution of the two brands of
gas.9 Hence, the plaintiffs' counsel essentially argued that the
agreement to eliminate pricing discretion of the venture's managers
was "horizontal price fixing" and therefore "per se" illegal.' 0 The
plaintiffs expressly waived any claim that the restraints were "unreasonable" under the "rule of reason", 1 although their position seemed
the restraint was illegal under a "quick
to allow them to
2 argue that
look" analysis.'
Although the plaintiffs developed a strong case that the restraint imposed on the venture lacked any apparent business justification, they did not advance any theory to explain how the elimination
of pricing discretion could result in higher prices. Nor did they produce evidence, which they apparently possessed, showing that prices
were increased not only by the joint venture's brands, but also by its
7 F. M. SCHERER & DAVID R. Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 8-11 (Rand McNally & Co. 1970); TIBOR SCITOVSKY,
WELFARE AND COMPETITION 319-337 (Irwin 1951).
8 Dagher, 369 F.3d at 1113.
9

Id.at 1113-14.
10 Id. Per se illegal restraints are ones without any legitimate competitive or ef-

ficiency justification such as cartels.
" Dagher, 547 U.S. at 3. The definition of the rule of reason remains elusive.
See, e.g., Peter CarstensenThe Content of the Hollow Core of Antitrust: The Chicago Boardof Trade Case and the Meaning of the "Rule of Reason" in Restraint of
Trade Analysis," 15 RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 1 (1992). In general, the
rule of reason evaluates restraints based on their effect on competition, the function
of the restraint, i.e., does it serve some legitimate business purpose or is its only use
to exclude or exploit, and, often times, the market power of the party imposing the
restraint.
12See generally Polygram Holding, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 416 F.3d 29
(D.C. Cir. 2005). In some cases, it is possible to determine that a restraint is unreasonable based on an examination of the conceded facts. The hallmark of such cases
is the lack of a rational and legitimate business justification for the restraint.
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competitors in the various regional markets. 13
The plaintiffs' position was that the owners of the joint venture engaged in an illegal restraint of trade by agreeing to limit the
pricing discretion of the managers within the enterprise because the
agreement lacked a non-exploitative explanation. 14 After extensive
discovery, the trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants.I5 The Ninth Circuit reversed based on its belief that the uncontested fact that Shell and Texaco had no explanation for their actions relating to the operation of the joint venture, meant that it was
possible the agreement was a naked restraint on competition and
therefore "per se" illegal.16
The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court and reinstated
the trial court's summary judgment of dismissal. 17 In a brief opinion
from Justice Thomas, the Court concluded that the owners of a joint
venture may agree on the prices to be charged and that this cannot be
"per se" illegal. 18 Thus stated, the result seems inescapable. What is
mysterious is why the Ninth Circuit had reversed the trial court's
summary judgment decision. Indeed, how could such a case have
survived a motion to dismiss on the pleadings? Unless the circuit
court panel was behaving totally irrationally, there must have been
some reasonable basis for concern about this record.
Joint ventures and other collective activity are rife in the oil
and gas industry. 19 Such arrangements, sometimes called "strategic
alliances", are also increasingly prevalent in a variety of other industries, especially those with significant levels of concentration. The
facts of Dagher suggest that such ventures may result in substantially
higher prices to consumers. Moreover, those higher prices may be
unrelated to any improvement in the quality of the products being
sold or to changes in the costs of inputs. Rather, they may simply be
the result of changes produced by the parties to the venture made to
Email communications with Daniel Schulman, counsel for petitioners, October 4, 2005, on file with the author [hereinafter Schulman Email]. See also
Dagher, 369 F.3d. at 1114-15.
14 See U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (a monopolist
must justify a restraint that has adverse effects on competition). This is a form of
13

the "quick look" analysis in that it would create a presumption of illegality that the
defendants would have to rebut.
15 Dagher v. Saudi Refining, Inc., 2002 WL 34099815 (C.D.Cal. 2002).
16 Dagher, 369

F.3d. at 1108.

17Dagher,547 U.S. at 2.
18 Id at 2-3.
19Brock, supranote 2.
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create market power or to more effectively exploit market power that
had been latent.
The following section first describes the Texaco-Shell venture
and its review by antitrust enforcement agencies. Second, the case
record, actual and potential, is summarized along with the Court's response. Third, the facts are revisited in terms of potential theories of
competitive effects. This will show that the facts raised serious questions about the decision of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to
allow this combination, as well as the failure of plaintiffs' counsel to
articulate coherent theories focused on the restraint of pricing discretion that would have warranted treating this specific restraint as impermissible. Finally, I critique the narrow decision of the Court and
suggest how a policy committed to competition as a process should
view this case. This leads to suggestions on both how plaintiffs
ought to present cases of this sort, and how those who enforce mergers and other aspects of antitrust law should view joint ventures and
other collaborations, especially in the field of petroleum products.

II. The Shell-Texaco Deal
In 1998, Texaco and Shell commenced two joint ventures.
One combined their refining and retailing activities west of the Mississippi River, while the other combined the same assets in the eastem half of the United States and included another partner.2 ° The two
companies continued to compete in the rest of the world -both had
major refining and retailing activities in other countries and continued to compete with each other in these markets. They also continued to compete with respect to some aspects of the broadly-defined
petroleum business in the United States, including competing for new
crude oil supplies.
The venture was well short of being a merger. Each party insisted on retaining rights to its brand names, which were only licensed to the venture. In addition, the parties imposed some limits on
the managers of the venture with respect to treatment of the two
treatment of the two
brands. The basic commitment was for equal
2
'
brands in terms of promotion and marketing.
The third partner was Saudi Oil. The original complaint charged that the
eastern venture also raised prices. However, that claim was dismissed since none
of the class members had purchased gasoline from that venture, which the courts
held to be discrete and separate from the western venture. Dagher, 369 F.3d at
1114-16. There was evidence in the record, nonetheless, that the two ventures op20

erated in a coordinated way. In particular, they adopted the same pricing strategy
as part of a collective action involving both ventures. Id. at 1115-16.
21 One potential business justification for Shell and Texaco's new pricing re-
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The purported rationale for the venture was that it would create important economies and efficiencies. The parties estimated a
savings of over $800 million a year.22 Exactly how such substantial
gains in operating efficiency would occur and why they would be
specific to this venture is not clear. Nothing in the official FTC reports provides any insight to this question. Certainly in some litigated cases, the provable claims of efficiency gains turned out to be
substantially less than those asserted to the antitrust enforcement
agencies. 24 Moreover, many efficiencies are not unique to the speIn that case, they do not provide any
cific transaction or merger.
justification since the gain could be achieved by other means without
paying any price in terms of anticompetitive effects. Another unknown is the ratio of purported savings to the total operating expense
of the enterprise. While $800 million is a substantial number, it
could be only 5 percent of total sales if that total were $16 billion.
Savings at such a level would seem to be modest and provide only
limited scope for price reductions.
The FTC and several state attorneys general investigated the
proposed joint venture. 26 After that investigation in which the parties
claimed that the joint venture would produce substantial efficiency
gains, there was a settlement by consent decree. The FTC complaint
identified a number of markets in which there would be adverse
competitive effects from the combination. 27 The complaint may well
have been written in light of the proposed settlement to which Texaco

quirement was to prohibit the regional managers from experimenting with different
pricing strategies because of the potential adverse effect on one or both brands from
changing its relative price. So far as appears in the briefing, neither Shell nor Texaco advanced this argument and, in any event, it would not explain the further requirement of uniform prices, which could interfere with profit maximizing pricing
strategies in specific retail markets. See Brief for the Petitioner, Texaco v. Dagher,
547 U.S. 1 (2006) (Nos. 04-805, 04-814); Reply Brief for Petitioner, Dagher, 547
U.S. 1 (Nos. 04-805, 04-814).
22
Dagher,547 U.S. at 3.
23

See Shell Oil. Co., FTC Docket No. C-3803, 125 F.T.C. 769 (1998) [herein-

after Shell Oil Co.]
24 See Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997)
25

See U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal

Merger Guidelines § 4 (1997) (only efficiencies that are "unlikely" to occur "in the
absence of the ...

proposed merger" will be considered as potential justifications

for an otherwise anticompetitive merger).
26 See Shell Oil Co., supra note 23.
27 Id.

at 775-77.
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and Shell agreed. 28 That settlement imposed some divestiture requirements with respect to refinery ownership and terminal facilities.
It also imposed some limits on the conduct of the joint venture and its
parents for a period of ten years. 29 In light of subsequent developments, it would be interesting to learn what the internal FTC assessment of the overall transaction was. It is worth noting that one com30
missioner dissented as to the relief, except as to one market.
However, there is nothing in the subsequent record of the case that
suggests that the FTC considered the potential of the joint venture to
use pricing strategy involving its two national brands to affect competition.
III. The Dagher Evidence and the Supreme Court
The plaintiffs were a class of retailers who had to pay the
higher prices resulting from the limitation on price differences. They
asserted that the decision to restrain the pricing discretion of the regional managers lacked any business justification. The plaintiffs focused their evidence on this issue and built a substantial record that
established this point. 31 But, of course, any business might be expected to raise prices if it can. Without something more, the plaintiffs only showed that the joint venture in some way had market
power and exploited that power.
Two issues central to the dispute are when was the price restraint imposed and why. With respect to timing, one version was
that it was an external command from the owners Texaco and Shell,
imposed some time after the venture was created. 31 As such, it would
be an interference with the normal ideas of managerial control. In
another version, the price restraint was an element of the venture
from the beginning as part of maximizing the economic potential of
the venture. What remains anomalous, under either version, is the
rationale for imposing such a limit on the pricing discretion of those
who set day-to-day prices in response to changes in both supply and
28

Id. at 777-93.

29

Id. at 790-91.

30

Id. at 812 (Commissioner Azcuenaga, concurring and dissenting).

3"Dagher, 369 F.3d at 1122 (finding by the court that "the Defendants have
thus far failed to offer any explanation of how their unified pricing of the distinct
Texaco and Shell brands of gasoline served to further the ventures' legitimate efforts to produce better products or capitalize on efficiencies").
32

Id. at 1112.

33 Id.
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demand, and who would ordinarily have the discretion to set prices
for different brands differently if that would maximize the total income of the enterprise. Gasoline prices vary greatly depending on
the specific location of the gas station receiving the fuel. Even stations located in the same community may have very different
prices. 34 Hence, pricing strategy is very local in character and cannot
have an overall uniformity. The reality of the situation is that the
only overall limit that owners could impose on those who decided on
local prices was to require that the price of the two brands be similar.
The plaintiffs did produce 35evidence of price increases for Shell and
Texaco in various markets.
Plaintiffs' counsel had additional evidence showing that, after
the elimination of price differences between Texaco and Shell, the
price of all gas in concentrated regional markets increased substantially. 36 Moreover, this evidence also showed that prices increased
most significantly in the markets where the joint venture had the
largest market share. However, this evidence never made it into the
record.
The core problem with the plaintiffs' case was that they did
not articulate any theory of why the joint venturers had decided to
eliminate the kind of pricing discretion that ordinarily would be a key
attribute of managers. Without an anticompetitive explanation, it is
hard to imagine why the owners of businesses cannot tell managers
what to do even if it is economically illogical.
The district court dismissed the case on summary judgment,
finding that there could not be a "per se" violation of the antitrust
laws. In light of Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting
System, 37 Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery
& Printing Co.,38 and other similar cases, the prima facie right of

owners of a venture to set prices seems indisputable. This would be
the case even if the price-setting system were irrational. On appeal, a
divided Ninth Circuit panel reversed that decision and remanded the
case for trial. The majority decision focused heavily on the lack of
rationality for the price restraint as well as evidence that the partners
34 Alexi Barrionuevo, Secret Forumlas Set the Pricefor Gasoline,WALL ST. J.,

Mar. 20, 2000, at B 1. Price differences for the same brand of gas are substantial

even within a single community. Id.
35
SeeDagher, 369 F.3d. at 1113.
36

Schulman Email, supra note 13.

Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys. Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
38 Nw Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S.
284 (1985).
37
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implemented the restraint only after getting clearance to create the
venture.39 At the same time, there was also some evidence that they
had intended, from the outset, to impose uniform prices on the two
brands, but they had concealed this from the FTC. These facts, if
proven, would lead the majority to believe that the restraint on price
might be a limit without any legitimate business justification. Once
again the weakness in the opinion is the lack of a positive theory to
explain how or why the elimination of price differences was more
than rational profit-maximizing by the owners of two brands.
There was consternation and outrage in the business community over the Court of Appeals' decision. This was evident by the
number of amicus briefs filed in connection with the Supreme Court
review. The obvious and legitimate concern was that whenever the
owners of a joint venture agreed upon any command relating to the
competitive conduct of the venture, they could be sued under the antitrust laws and were at risk of having a court declare their conduct illegal "per se" or based on a "quick look" regardless of the prima facie legitimacy of such actions. On the other hand, a cynic might
wonder why, if usually legitimate business reasons exist for managing aspects of the competitive conduct of joint ventures, the business
world was so intent on establishing an absolute right of the owners to
control the venture regardless of the economic analysis of the merits
of that conduct.
The brief opinion by Justice Thomas recognizes that the owners of a joint venture necessarily must command its actions in the
market. This kind of restraint is internal to the venture (at its "core")
and an essential component of any joint ownership of productive assets.4 ' In an interesting aside, Justice Thomas distinguishes "ancillary" restraints as those that affect third parties conduct when they
deal with a venture. 42 This distinction is suggestive that stricter re39 Dagher,369 F.3d at 1122-25.
40 Transcript of Oral Argument, Texaco v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006) (Nos. 04-

805, 04-814), available at 2005 WL 3464475. See listing for "Briefs and Other Related Documents" at the end of the electronic version of the oral argument transcript.
41 Dagher,547 U.S. at 4.

42 Id. at 3-4. For example, if the owners agreed on how they would compete
in related markets, as Shell and Texaco did, such an agreement would be ancillary
in Justice Thomas's terms. Similarly, if the venture imposed a restraint on the resale of its product such as minimum price, that too could be ancillary. However,
historically it would be viewed with great concern. See Dr. Miles v. John D. Park
& Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911); see also Leegin Creative Leather Prod. v. PSKS, 127
S.Ct. 763 (2006) (granting certiorari to review the per se rule of Dr. Miles, 220 U.S.
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view is appropriate when the restraint involves such external controls.
Conversely, when the restraint is internal to the transaction or venture, it is subject to a strong presumption of validity.
The Court's opinion, in fact, suggests at one point that such
internal restraints are both inherently ancillary and "valid. ' ' 43 Such an
approach would negate any challenge to such a restraint even if it was
excessive in terms of the legitimate interest of the parties. 44 However, at other points the opinion reflects the general modern rule
stemming from United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. that all
restraints are subject to a "rule of reason".4 5 The harder question is
what does that "rule" mean in context. The only clue from the
Dagher opinion is that when the restraint involves a "core" attribute
of a venture, the fact that it is an irrational limit in terms of business
logic is not sufficient to turn it into a violation.
A prior Supreme Court decision, Northwest Wholesale Stationers, provides guidance on this question.46 There too, the restraint
(a membership rule) was part of the "core" of the venture. Without
such rules, a venture lacks definition. In rejecting a similar kind of
mechanical "per se" claim based on exclusion from membership, the
Court pointed out two routes by which the plaintiff could establish
that the action was unreasonable.
The first option would be for the plaintiff to establish that the
defendants had significant market power in the markets affected by
the restraint (their exclusion from access to the benefits of the joint
venture).47 The implication of such proof is that it would then be
relevant to the public interest in competition for a court to review the
specific reasonableness of the exclusion. If there were no market
power implication, then the premise would be that the market processes would eliminate any unreasonable restraint imbedded in a joint
venture. However, if the venture had market power, then it would be
important to review those core components to ensure that they did not
unnecessarily hamper competition in that, or related, markets. The
373 (1911)).
43 Id.

Such an approach would return antitrust law to the standard set forth in
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897) and United
States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898), where the Court distinguished
between "direct" (i.e., naked restraints) and "indirect" ones (i.e., ancillary restraints) and held that only direct restraints could violate antitrust law.
45 Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898) aff'd
175 U.S. 211 (1899).
46
Nw Wholesale Stationers, 472 U.S. at 284.
44

47

Id.at 296.
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recent successful litigation over credit card membership rules provides a clear illustration of the context in which such antitrust review
is essential.48
The second option, from Northwest Wholesale Stationers, is
for the plaintiff to undertake to prove that the restraint is "pretextual,"
despite its apparent linkage to the core of the venture. 9 The plaintiff
would have to undertake to prove that the restraint was, in function
only, a naked restraint on competition. This is a return to the United
States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association and United States v.
Joint Traffic approaches of Justice Peckham. 50 The obvious rationale
for such an approach is that if the only function of the restraint is to
eliminate competition or exploit consumers or suppliers, then such
conduct is inherently harmful to the competitive process. While this
option ends with a "per se" conclusion, it must start with the statement of a theory of how the conduct at issue is only a naked restraint
of competition and refute any alternative explanation tendered by the
defendants. Thus, the plaintiffs, relying on this approach, must do
more than demonstrate that the restraint lacks a positive business justification. The plaintiffs must also show that the conduct is consistent
with one or more theories that support the conclusion that the function of the restraint was only to harm competition. In some contexts,
this may be an impossible burden to meet. However, it is not irrational to impose such a burden where the restraint is a prima facie
core element of the collective enterprise.
IV. Dagher Facts Revisited
The question left unexplored in the lower courts and the Supreme Court is why Shell and Texaco would have followed the pricing strategy that they did. It is not a prima facie rational economic
strategy. While it is plausible that identical prices might be a profitmaximizing strategy in some markets, there is no reason to think that
it would be in all markets. Nor is it logical to constrain the executives charged with setting local prices by requiring in all markets that
prices be same.
Professor Steven Ross has suggested that such a price strategy
might be a consequence of the inefficiencies inherent in a joint venture. 51 The Ross speculation still does not explain what the two com48

United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229 (2nd Cir. 2003)

Nw. Wholesale Stationers,472 U.S. at 296-98.
50 See Trans-Missiouri166 U.S. at 290; Joint Traffic, 171 U.S.
at 505.
5' See Brief of Amicus Curiae American Antitrust Institute in Support of Re49
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panies were seeking to achieve by eliminating the pricing difference
between the two brands. This is particularly curious because, as independent enterprises, they clearly had decided that different prices
were the best marketing strategy. Since neither Texaco nor Shell exited the market, and the joint venture only involved the downstream
refining and distribution of the two brands while retaining the unique
characteristics of each, there is no obvious reason to believe that there
was some significant change in the market context that warranted a
new strategy for pricing.
Three anti-competitive hypotheses exist that might explain
why the price restraint was imposed. Because the plaintiffs did not
attempt to hypothesize why the restraints existed and contented themselves with proving that the needs of the joint venture did not warrant
any kind of price control, these hypotheses necessarily remain hypothetical. However, there is some evidence (both within the overall
record of the case and external to it) that at least permits some testing
of the plausibility of each of these theories.
A. A Unilateral Effects Theory
One possible theory is that Shell and Texaco are closely substitutable brands-more so than other brands. Hence, once the two
were jointly marketed, it made sense to eliminate the price differential. The effect of this action was to raise the price of gasoline to
Texaco buyers, and to remove the differential from selecting Shell.
Those customers who had previously favored Texaco to Shell, only
because of the price differences, would now be indifferent between
the two brands or even switch brands. If the bulk of Texaco buyers
were only willing to consider the two brands, then while there would
be some switching from Texaco to Shell there would be little overall
attrition. On this assumption about substitution, it would also now be
possible to raise both the Shell and Texaco brand prices substantially
above their prior levels. 52 Those customers who had stayed with
spondents at 12, Texaco v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2005) (Nos. 04-805, 04-814). Professor Ross was the primary drafter of that brief which makes the argument that
such a price strategy could result in inefficiencies in a partially-integrated joint venture. The implication is that a different strategy would be taken if the venture were
fully integrated. Hence, the strategy results in inefficient, excessive prices resulting
in harm to consumers. Professor Ross has elaborated on this concept in his work on
professional sports leagues. See also Stephen Ross and Stefan Szymanski, Antitrust
and Inefficient Joint Ventures: Why Sports Leagues Should Look More Like
McDonald's and Less Like the United Nations, 16 MARQUETTE SPORTs L. J. 213
(2006).
52

See Dagher, 369 F.3d. at 1113 (evidencing that prices for both brands were

increased despite lower costs).
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Texaco would still have no alternative given the assumption they
only would switch to Shell. Moreover, the Shell customers who
similarly might switch to Texaco would likewise have no incentive to
change. Thus, assuming these two brands were unique substitutes,
common control would encourage price uniformity and escalation to
exploit the willingness of these customers to remain loyal to these
two brands. Indeed, because there would be little loss to other
brands, the total sales of the two brands in combination would change
significantly.
This is a unilateral effects theory and would suggest that the
FTC analysis of the joint venture missed a major competitive harm.5 3
It would also imply that the two brands in combination had substantial market power. Hence, the coordination of prices between the two
brands would allow the joint venture to exploit consumers in ways
that neither brand could if standing alone. Such an analysis of the
conduct would also arguably satisfy the first option from Northwest
Stationers so that further judicial review of the reasonableness of the
restraint on pricing discretion would be warranted.
However, this theory has holes in it. First, there is little evidence that there is much brand loyalty in gasoline sales.5 4 In general,
lost sales would be likely to flow to a number of different brands
based on the location and price of the alternative stations. Second,
there is no reason to believe that Shell and Texaco were particularly
close substitutes. In fact, the record suggests that the two brands appealed to different types of customers. Texaco's clientele was more
blue collar or rural while Shell's clientele was more upscale and urban. 55 Third, the extra-record evidence suggests that prices of all
substantial competitors moved up in relative harmony. 56 This would
suggest that the price increases were a result of some kind of coordinated price movement.
B. A Regional Cartel Signaling Theory
The central apparent consequence of the change in pricing
53 The GAO Report, supra note 2 (reporting that following consolidation refin-

ers sold less gas to generics thus reducing the pressure on branded gasoline to compete on price).
54 Id. The report found that the generic gas was a significant factor in control-

ling the prices of branded gas. This demonstrates that consumers were and are
willing to substitute in ways that are inconsistent with the unilateral effects theory.
Id.
" Dagher,369 F.3d at 1112.
56
See Schulman Email,supra note 13.
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was that Texaco's brand ceased to be the low priced, national brand.
Instead, its price came into conformity with that of other brands of
gasoline. Moreover, in a number of regional markets this price coordination between Shell and Texaco represented a substantial share of
local market sales. 57 Finally, after the change in pricing, prices generally rose rapidly in these markets despite dropping crude oil prices
and purported increased efficiency in refining and distribution arising
from the joint venture.
The data thus presented is consistent with a signaling to regional competitors of a new willingness on the part of the joint venture partners to engage in tacit collusion. The central premise would
be that prior to this signal, other major retailers were concerned that
customers would switch to the marginally less costly Texaco brand if
prices increased substantially. This held in check the willingness to
engage in coordinated price increases. By eliminating that price differential the venturers signaled their interest in engaging in a more
active tacit collusion over prices. Given the signal, regional managers could then coordinate prices relatively easily by watching the
prices of competitors.
The hypothesis is that the change to price uniformity across
the entire region was a clear signal to other gasoline retailers that the
Texaco-Shell joint venture would not engage in opportunistic pricing
by holding down the Texaco brand when others raised their prices.
In effect, the joint venture was giving a guarantee that it would not
use its strategic capacity to engage in price differentiation. This, in
turn, would encourage competitors to rely on the commitment of the
joint venture managers to maintain prices. In addition, any price
competition would require that the prices on both brands be cut
equally. To the extent that the two brands were sold to somewhat differentiated customers and the stations were concentrated in different
parts of the market area, this price uniformity would also tie together
larger areas. 58 It would also ensure that price coordination would be
more pervasive if successful and that any price war would reach a
broader area, thus increasing the cost of price competition.
Viewed from this perspective, the price uniformity would signal both an increased willingness to engage in tacit price collusion
and create capacity to retaliate if other retailers sought to use different prices in parts of the regional market. Such a theory would satisfy the "pretextual" option from Northwest Wholesale Stationers
See Dagher, 369 F.3d at 1111 (the combined firm held at least 25 percent of
all gasoline sales in the western half of the United States).
58 See id. (the areas and customers served by the two brands were quite differ57
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since it involves a demonstration that the change in policy is explicable only because it was undertaken to facilitate tacit or express collusion with the other major gas retailers.
The weakness of this theory is the lack of support in the record. To be convincing, one would want data on actual price changes
in gasoline in the regional markets in the period after the elimination
of the price differential. Was the change in policy clearly communicated to the market? In particular, was the fact that prices would be
uniform made evident? This fact is pivotal to the theory advanced
here. Unless the joint venture communicated the new constraint on
its managers' pricing discretion, competitors would not have had as
clear a basis to predict how the venture would respond to price increases or decreases. In his recent study of the oil and gas industry,
Brock describes the "clubby" nature of the industry. 59 The fact that
the same companies are involved in a variety of joint enterprises and
frequently swap gasoline may suggest that there would have been informal ways to communicate the new policy as well as signal new
pricing strategies. Alas, the plaintiffs' counsel did not undertake to
put whatever evidence they had on these issues into the record on appeal.
C. Global Cartel Signaling Theory
A second theory of cartelistic conduct focuses on the global
markets in which both of the parents continued to participate. In
some of those markets, they are dominant firms and impose supracompetitive prices. However, in those same markets, there are outlets for other global competitors who can disrupt such exploitation by
discounting prices. The result is a global system of mutual forbearance in which each major competitor has the capacity to disrupt other
competitors' dominant markets. 60 The price of peace is that no one
will engage in price cutting in order to obtain market share in the low
volume markets.
Against this background and accepting the joint venture's
claim that it would achieve substantial economies in the refining and
distribution of gasoline, there is a potentially serious risk of disrupting the global compact if the venture used its efficiency to drive
down prices in the west and capture greater market share. The decision to eliminate pricing discretion can then be hypothesized to re59 Brock, supra note 2.
60 There is long history to such mutual forbearance.
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flect a signal to the other major competitors that the venture would
not engage in any kind of strategic high-low pricing between its two
brands in ways that might shift market share to the venture. Instead,
the venture would content itself with increasing retail prices thereby
increasing its profits within its regional market, but not disrupting the
overall understanding that governed global competition.
This theory is not inconsistent with the known facts. Texaco
and Shell continued to face the same small group of major competitors in markets around the world. A price war in any region could
stimulate responses in other markets where the aggressor would least
like to face competition. Once again, the elimination of the price differential between the two brands would be a signal to the other major
players that the joint venture was not going to engage in vigorous
price competition. Indeed, the fact that the same policy covered the
Eastern United States as well further supports the theory that this was
a signal to global competitors. 61
This theory, however, does not account for the price increase
of gasoline in the markets where the Texaco-Shell venture had a leading market share. As such, it is less plausible as an explanation for
that specific set of events. Still, it is a somewhat more plausible explanation for the complete elimination of price differences. That is
an easier signal for global competitors to receive. The fundamental
problem with this theory, like the regional cartel signaling theory, is
that the plaintiffs made no effort to develop the information that
would support such an explanation for the conduct of Texaco and
Shell. Admittedly, the factual support for this theory is less easily
identifiable. However, armed with a testable theory, it becomes possible to look for specific exchanges of information among the major
firms, for past similar events, and for any other confirmation that the
historical interdependence of the industry continued.
Like the prior conspiracy theory, this theory can satisfy the
"pretext" option because it too would rest on the proposition that the
only reason for the restraint on pricing freedom was to signal other
global competitors that the new venture was not going to disrupt the
on-going oligopoly's tacit collusion.
Finally, the two collusion theories are not inconsistent with
each other. One might postulate that the joint venture had two possible strategies that it could pursue. One was to lower prices relative to
its competitors (given its enhanced efficiency) and to seek larger
market shares for its two brands with a resulting increase in profits
based on higher sales volume. The second option was to facilitate local, tacit collusion and gain higher per sale profits despite some re6i

Dagher, 369 F.3d at 11 11-13.
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duction in total sales. The second option would also reduce or eliminate the risk of a global or multi-regional price war that might result
from the venture being more aggressive in its pricing in the United
States. Thus, the owners, as rational business decision makers, having an eye on the long-term best interests of their overall enterprises,
might well have opted for the tacit collusion strategy even if its short
term profit prospects were somewhat less than aggressive price competition. 62 This would have made sense because, in the long run, that
strategy reduced the overall risk of competition breaking out in any
number of markets.

V.The Flawed FTC Analysis-Unilateral or Collusive
Market Power
Given the apparent pricing patterns engaged in by the venture,
it seems that FTC approval was misguided.63 Even if there would be
some efficiency gain unique to the venture, a claim that would not be
readily testable at the proposal stage, the increased regional market
power ought to have lead to a rejection of the venture. Basically, the
asserted post-venture price increases in a period of declining cost
mean that either the venture created unilateral market power as postulated in part IV A or it facilitated the creation and use of collusive
market power as postulated in parts IV B or IV C.
The post-creation conduct of the venture calls into question
the motivation of the parties in creating the venture. Retail gasoline
markets are both relatively local and apparently amenable to various
kinds of price manipulation.64 The approach of the FTC appears
flawed because it sought to remedy what it perceived to be specific
risks in specific markets. This overlooked the overall capacity of
these firms to compete with each other and, equally or more important, constitute potential competitive threats to each other in all markets in which they were not presently marketing gas.
62

This is an application of the "prisoners' dilemma" used in game theory. The

best long-run strategy is cooperation because competition invites retaliation and
that results in reduced income for the parties. Peter Carstensen, While Antitrust
Was Out to Lunch: Lessons from the 1980s for the Next Century of Enforcement,
48 Smu L. Rev. 1881, 1886-93 (1995) (discussing Robert Axelrod, The Evolution
of Cooperation (Basic Books 1984) that demonstrates that cooperation, tacit collusion in antitrust terms, is the optimal long run solution of the prisoners' dilemma).
63 The GAO Report, supra note 2. The GAO report is critical of the FTC's
merger enforcement record because of the evidence of adverse effects on consumers as a result of the increased concentration that the agency permitted. Id.
64 See Barrionuevo, supra note 34, at B1.
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Assuming the accuracy of the post-venture price data showing
increased prices for the two brands despite lower input costs and improved efficiency, the FTC's investigation did not recognize how the
parties could exploit their combination to create adverse effects on
consumers. Moreover, it seems that the harm to consumers exceeded
the efficiency gains to the parties, again assuming there were actual
gains that were also specific to this venture.
From the standpoint of merger enforcement, the implication
of these facts is that the agencies should not try to "slice and dice" the
assets. It is too likely that the result will be that the agency does not
get it right. Indeed, in a major post-settlement study, the FTC found
that a significant65number of its partial divestiture settlements had not
been successful.
The basic message is that when the market is concentrated,
the answer to proposed combinations, whether as mergers or joint
ventures, is to just say no. The agencies are not sophisticated enough
or knowledgeable enough to figure out how the merger will harm
competition. Moreover, if there are real and significant efficiencies,
it is very likely that one or both parties can figure out how to achieve
those without the detriment of increased concentration.

VI. The Concealed Point of Dagher
The underlying facts of Dagher make it abundantly clear that
market structure matters and is a central issue in antitrust claims.
When concentration increases, the incentives to exploit latent opportunities increase along with the capacity to do so. The result is a
"bigger is better" mentality in corporate boardrooms. However, the
issue for victims of the combination is what can be done to ameliorate the harms. While it is possible for both private parties and the
affected states to challenge consummated mergers, this is an unlikely
route.
Damage litigation is the ultimate source of hope both to deter
future conduct and to compensate the victims of exploitation. It is
also remunerative to the lawyers who represent such plaintiffs, provided they can collect their reasonable attorneys' fees. The challenge
for those who would represent plaintiffs is how to present such cases
so that they do not sink into an interminable and probably unwinnable open-ended "rule of reason" argument.In order to avoid unbearable costs and delays, plaintiffs' lawyers must think along the
65
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lines of the evolution of the law and not just in conventional doctrinal
categories.
The strength of the plaintiffs' case in Dagherwas the recognition that the starting point of an attack is to show that the restraint at
issue lacks a non-exploitative business justification. The weakness
was that having established that analysis, there was no follow up to
show that the conduct was logically and empirically consistent with
an explicitly anticompetitive hypothesis.
Consumer welfare is a central concern in antitrust rhetoric.
Therefore, it is essential for plaintiffs to go beyond a claim that there
is no legitimate justification for specific conduct and show how it can
affirmatively harm consumers. Such a claim extends the exposure of
a plaintiff. There must be support not only for the lack of justification for the conduct, but also for the affirmative theory of how this
conduct harms consumers. It is deeply regrettable that the Dagher
lawyers did not do more to articulate and demonstrate the creditable
claims they had concerning the harm to consumers directly resulting
from the Texaco-Shell agreement to eliminate price differentials.
A different critique applies to the Court. It has, in other decisions, expressed a positive enthusiasm for monopoly.6 6 The Court
believes that monopoly profits are the reward for innovative efforts
Only a very effective
by firms on the frontier of new technology.
presentation of the underlying business facts and their economic
analysis can possibly overcome the Court's prejudice in favor of incumbents, even monopolistic ones.
Thus, the "point" of Dagher is that those who would challenge anticompetitive conduct by dominant firms or joint ventures
need to develop an analysis that focuses on harms to consumers and
the competitive process that has or will result from the conduct at issue (regardless of the doctrinal category in which they propose to locate their case). In some situations, this is going to be a serious challenge to plaintiffs. However, the plaintiff and its lawyer should
address that issue at the outset and not rely on some legal characterization of the conduct.
The Dagher facts highlight the need for better conceptualization of claims. The plaintiff focused on the fact that two former
competitors, Shell and Texaco, agreed to eliminate competition between them and then agreed to fix the price at which their products
66

Verizon Commc'n v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).

67 Id. at 407. Some cynics noted that Justice Scalia's praise of monopoly was
lavished on a case involving the monopolist heir to the AT&T monopoly that had
used its inherited monopoly power to exclude innovative competition. See, e.g.,
United States v. AT&T, 524 F. Supp. 1336 (D.D.C. 1981).
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were sold to the public. Price fixing among competitors is "per se ilhniit is not. 69 It is insufficient to show that a par' 8 except when
legal, ',,68
ticular piece of conduct lacks apparent economic rationality when
that conduct is within the core of what partners and joint venturers
may well do, even if it is irrational.70 It is vital to present the positive
case showing how this particular conduct fits with an anticompetitive
scheme that harms competitors.
The frustration that some have with Dagher,is not in the sensible result of the Court on its statement of the facts. Rather, the
problem lies in an awareness of what could have been said to show
that the conduct in question only made sense if it had an anticompetitive goal. To be sure, the Court is now generally opposed to antitrust
However, it remains possible that the majority's opposition
law.
stems in substantial part from the failure of those supporting more active antitrust enforcement to make the case on the merits of those
claims. Stare decisis is a concept that courts all too often honor in
theory rather than practice.

VII. Conclusion
The Dagher case may ultimately be a mere footnote in the
data set of antitrust decisions of the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, it
illustrates a couple of important issues. First, in some industries such
as oil and gas, consolidation may impose significant costs on consumers even when, presumably, the standard indicia of likelihood of
harm are limited. This suggests that in authorizing mergers and joint
ventures both federal and state antitrust agencies should exercise
greater veto power than they have in the past. Second, when private
parties suffer harm as a direct result of the failure to retain a worka68

United States v. Socony-Vaccuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940).

69

Broad. Music, 441 U.S. at 9 ("Literalness is overly simplistic and often

overly broad.")
70 To paraphrase Justice Scalia: Conduct can be both economic folly and lawful. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 96-97 (1987) (Scalia, J
concurring).
7' No antitrust plaintiff has prevailed in the Supreme Court since the early
1990s. See Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Serv., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992)
(sustaining denial of summary judgment and remanding for trial). Since then, all of
the Court's decisions have favored the opponents of antitrust. See, e.g., Prof'I Real
Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49 (1993); State Oil Co. v.
Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997); NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128 (1998);
California Dental Ass'n v. Fed.Trade Comm'n, 526 U.S. 756 (1999); Verizon
Commc'n v. Law Office of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004); Illinois Tool
Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, 547 U.S. 28 (2006).
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bly competitive market, their lawyers need to present a theory of how
the merger or venture harmed competition. Proving the negative (it
had no legitimate justification) is not sufficient. In today's world, the
plaintiff has a much better chance to succeed when it shows how the
arrangement or combination has or will harm consumers. Unfortunately, this is not always easy. However, it behooves those who
would challenge anticompetitive conduct to do their homework before litigation and not leave it to the law journals to suggest what
might have been.

